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NOTE
THE UNIONIZATION OF LAW FIRMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although traditionally among the most difficult to organize, increasing
numbers of "white-collar" employees are beginning to believe that unionization is a means of achieving better terms and conditions of employment.'
Advances in technology, particularly the increased use of the computer, and
the growth in size of corporations and law firms have contributed to the
routinization and bureaucratization of many white-collar jobs. Changes resulting from such advances and growth, along with the attendant depersonalization and lack of communication between employer and employee, are
serving to blur the perceived distinctions between white-collar workers and
blue-collar workers. 2 Law firm employees, in line with this trend, have
exhibited an increased interest in unionization. 3 On the other hand, the legal
profession has traditionally considered itself to be a learned profession, 4 as
opposed to a trade or commercial enterprise, and thus exempt from the
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)5 and other statutes
that derive their constitutional authority from the commerce clause. 6 Nevertheless, various federal regulatory provisions have been held applicable to law
firms. 7 Moreover, on May 4, 1977, the National Labor Relations Board
1. While the numbers are increasing, from 2.42 million in 1956 to 3.6 million in 1976, the
proportion remains small compared to the large increase in the numbers of white-collar workers.
A. Sloane & F. Witney, Labor Relations 9 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Labor Relations].
2. See generally Labor Relations, supra note 1, at 14-18; Kassalow, New Union Frontier:
White-Collar Workers, 40 Harv. Bus. Rev. 41, 46-47 (1962); Doctors, Nurses, Teachers-Why
More Are Joining Unions, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 10, 1975, at 61.
3. See Request for Review of the Decision of the Acting Regional Director at 13, Foley, Hong
& Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,116 (May 4, 1977). See also
Hochberger, Longshoremen's Unit Moves To Organize Law Firm Workers, 178 N.Y.L.J., Aug.
25, 1977, at 1, col. 2; Levin, Unionism in Law Firms-A Commentary, 178 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 31,
1977, at 1, col. 2; Lublin, Secretaries'Revolt, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 1; 178
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 5; 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1977, at I, col. 4.
4. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The primary body of labor relations law that
is generally known as the National Labor Relations Act is composed of three separate statutes
enacted at twelve-year intervals: the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act), ch. 372,
49 Stat. 449 (1935), the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LandrumGriffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959).
6. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For example, the learned profession exemption has been
relied upon in the context of the Sherman Act. See notes 40-42 infra and accompanying text.
7. In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Supreme Court held that law
firms "affecting commerce" would be subject to the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975). In addition, secretarial and clerical employees of law firms are entitled to coverage under
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Wage and
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(Board) in a unanimous opinion decided to assert jurisdiction over law firms
as a class.8 Relying on a Supreme Court finding that the practice of law is
"trade or commerce" 9 within the meaning of the Sherman Act' 0 and "that the
activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial intercourse,""II the
Board found that "it is clear that law firms, as a class, do have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce"1 2 within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act.
At the time of the ruling, one commentator stated that the Board's decision
was likely to result in better treatment, improved working conditions, and
higher pay scales for employees of major law firms. 13 Six months later,
another commentator noted that the reaction of some members of the Bar to
the possibility of unions in law firms was one of "serious concern" and
recommended that firms respond with a "calm approach but not necessarily a
passive one."' 4 Despite this concern on the part of law firms, the decision and
the possibility of better treatment and working conditions prompted an
increase in union organizational efforts within the legal profession. An organizational campaign in major New York City law firms was undertaken by
Local 6 of the International Federation of Health Professionals, an affiliate of
the International Longshoremen's Association,IS and by District 65 of the
Distributive Workers of America.' 6 In addition, law office workers, in New
Hour Opinion Letter No. 49 (Nov. 2, 1961). Professionals, including associate attorneys, are not
covered by this Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

8. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, (1977-78) 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 18,116
(May 4, 1977).
9. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).

10.

15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).

11.

Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).

12.

Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)

18,116, at

30,069 (May 4, 1977).

13.

Fitzhugh, NLRB Upholds LaborRights for Employees of Law Firms, 177 N.Y.L.J., May

13, 1977, at 1, col. 2.

14. Levin, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2.
15. See Hochberger, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2. The firms targeted for union drives were
among New York's oldest and largest. Local 6's petition for a representation election of 26 clerical
employees of Hughes Hubbard & Reed was dismissed by the Regional Director of Region 2 on the
ground that the bargaining unit was inappropriate. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-1772S
(Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-i (Dec. 29, 1977). See
notes 151-60 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this decision. Local 6 was also
seeking to organize the 375 nonlegal employees of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 178 N.Y.L.J.,
Nov. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 4, and the 84 clerical and paralegal employees of Davis, Polk &
Wardwell, 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1977, at 1, col. 5. The president of Local 6 claimed that more
than 85% of the eligible employees at Davis, Polk had signed cards showing an interest in union
representation. Id. See also Levin, supra note 3, at 4, col. 2.
16. Hochberger, supra note 3, at 2, cois. 3-4. District 65 already represents law office workers
at the New York Civil Liberties Union, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Rabinowitz,
Boudin & Standard, a private law firm. The Distributive Workers Union is known as the office
workers' union. An organizer from District 65 expected the bargaining units to contain secretaries, bookkeepers, file clerks, and telephone operators. Id.
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York City and elsewhere, began to consider the option of union representation. 17
This Note will first consider the constitutional question of whether the
Board has the power to assert jurisdiction over private law firms as a class. 18
In order to do so, the Board must find that law firms, as a class, affect
commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause. Then, an analysis of
whether the Board should assert such jurisdiction will be presented. The
analysis will focus on two problems: (1) whether law firms have a substantial
impact on commerce within the meaning Qf section 14(c)(1) of the NLRA, 19
and (2) whether there are insurmountable problems connected with conflict of
interest and the attorney-client relationship which should prevent unionization of law firm employees. 20 Finally, this Note will deal with questions
concerning the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit. 21 Three types
of employees of a law firm will be discussed: associate
attorneys, 22 parale24
23
gals, and administrative and support employees.
II.

CAN THE BOARD ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER

LAW FIRMS AS A CLASS?'

The National Labor Relations Act empowers the Board to regulate various
aspects of labor relations. "It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in
order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights
of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce
....

,"25 The Supreme Court "has consistently declared that in passing the

National Labor Relations Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board
the fullest jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause."' 26 The Court has also held that the Board
has the power to
27
determine whether certain practices affect commerce.
17. See Hochberger, supra note 3, at 2, col. 4; Request for Review of the Decision of the
Acting Regional Director, exhibits B, C, D, and E, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80,
[1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
18,116 (May 4, 1977); Brief of Women Organized for
Employment and Legal Secretaries United as Amicus Curiae at 3-4, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229
N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 18,116 (May 4, 1977).
18. See pt. II infra.
19. See pt. III(A) infra. The Board has decided not to assert its jurisdiction to the fullest
possible statutory extent. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
20. See pt. III(B) infra.
21. See pt. IV infra.
22. See pt. IV(A) infra.
23. See pt. IV(B) infra.
24. See pt. IV(C) infra.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1970). The NLRA definition of commerce is "trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States." NLRA § 2(6), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(6) (1970). The Act defines "affecting commerce" as "in commerce, or burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor
dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." NLRA § 2(7), 29
U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970).
26. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); see Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1944);
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The Board, moreover, need not find a direct nexus between the business of
the employer and interstate commerce because the statutory language "affecting commerce" can extend to some activities that are wholly intrastate. That
is, the activity need not actually be interstate commerce, but must somehow
affect interstate commerce. Thus, an employer may "affect commerce" and
therefore be subject to the Board's jurisdiction although it is not engaged in
interstate commerce. 28 In one extreme example of the kind of intrastate
activities that have been held to affect commerce, the Supreme Court held
that Congress could regulate the production of wheat consumed entirely at
the farm on which it was grown, on the theory thai changes in the volume
of such wheat could affect the supply and demand for grain sold across
state boundaries. 29 Hence, it would seem that very few activities do not
affect interstate commerce. Even in Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt &
Rothschild, 30 in which the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over law
NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1937). Thus, the NLRA derives its authority from the commerce clause, which provides
that Congress shall have the power "To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Coast. art. I, § 8, ci. 3. The NLRA, however,
does provide for some specific exclusions. Certain types of employers are not defined as employers
for the purpose of the NLRA: the United States, any wholly owned government corporation, the

Federal Reserve Bank, states and political subdivisions thereof, persons subject to the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970), and any labor organization (other than when acting as
an employer). NLRA § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Certain employees are
also specifically excluded from the NLRA's coverage: agricultural laborers, those in domestic
service to a person or family at his home, individuals employed by a parent or spouse,
independent contractors, supervisors (as defined in NLRA § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970)),
and employees employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act. NLRA § 2(3), 29
U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970). In addition, the Board has created two other exclusios, for "managerial
employees" and "confidential employees." Managerial employees are those "who are in a position
to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies." Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B.
1317, 1322 (1946). "[Mlanagerial status is not conferred upon rank-and-file workers, or upon
those who perform routinely, but rather it is reserved for those in executive-type positions, those
who are closely aligned with management as true representatives of management." General
Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974). See notes 86-99 infra and accompanying text for
discussion of confidential employees.
27. Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1944).
28. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604 (1939); NLRB v. Dixie Terminal Co., 210 F.2d
538, 539 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015 (1954); NLRB v. J. L. Hudson Co., 135 F.2d
380, 382 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 740 (1943).
29. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Since that decision, the commerce power has
been the basis for asserting federal jurisdiction over numerous activities that have little to do with
interstate commerce, including truck dealers, Liddon White Truck Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 1181 (1948);
grocery stores, Providence Pub. Mkt. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1948); newspapers selling only
0.5% of their copies out of state, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); and
maintenance firms, D. A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
30. 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973). This firm was relatively small, consisting of five attorney
partners and seven attorney associates. The other firm over which the Board declined to assert
jurisdiction was also a small firm consisting of four lawvyers. See Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194
N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972).
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firms, on discretionary grounds, the Board stated that it had the legal
authority to exercise jurisdiction over law firms that supplied commerce
data3 l that satisfied the liberally construed "affecting commerce" test. 32 The
Board pointed out that modern-day law firms assisted large corporations,
labor unions, and other institutional entities in their interstate activity,
including, for example, the negotiation and formulation of complex interstate
agreements relating to trade and business. 33 Such assistance was found to
"affect commerce."
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,34 an antitrust case, the Supreme Court
examined the nature of legal practice and the relationship between lawyers
and interstate commerce. The Court held that the Sherman Act applied to
attorneys in that case because searches of local land titles for clients affected
interstate commerce. 35 The Court analyzed local lawyers' activities in relation
to other "transactions which create the need for the particular legal services in
question," 3 6 and it found the necessary nexus with interstate commerce on the
grounds that local real estate markets often rely on out-of-state financing and
that many home loans are guaranteed by the federal government. 37 There31. Employers are expected to file a commerce data questionnaire with the Board so that It
can determine whether that employer is within the monetary standards which the Board has
established. On the basis of this data, the Board may decide not to exercise jurisdiction over an
employer whose impact on commerce is determined by the Board not to be significant. For
example, the Board will decline to exercise jurisdiction over retail concerns with less than
$500,000 of yearly gross sales. A. Cox, D. Bok & R. Gorman, Cases and Materials on Labor Law
97-98 (8th ed. 1977); R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law § 2 (1976). The jurisdictional
standards which, for the most part, are still in effect were promulgated in Siemons Mailing Serv.,
122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). Congressional enactment of NLRA § 14(c)(1) in the Landrum-Griffin
Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (1959), gave explicit approval to the Board's
discretionary declination of jurisdiction, but prohibited the Board from making its jurisdictional
standards any more restrictive: "[Tihe Board shall not declire to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1,
1959." 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970). In 1947, Congress authorized the Board, as a means of
relieving some of its caseload, to agree to cede jurisdiction of Board cases to a state or territorial
agency having regulations consistent with the NLRA. NLRA § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
However, the Board has not yet exercised this option.
32. 206 N.L.R.B. at 512; accord, Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1217 (1972). See
also NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224 (1963); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322
U.S. 643 (1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939'; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
33. 206 N.L.R.B. at 513.
34. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
35. Id. at 783-85. In Goldfarb, the plaintiffs had sued the Fairfax County Bar Association
alleging that the minimum fee schedule of the county bar and its enforcement by the state bar, as
applied to fees for legal services relating to real estate transactions, constituted price fixing in
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held that minimum fee schedules did restrain
competition among attorneys and were therefore a violation of the Act. Id. at 781-83. See notes
72-74 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the applicability of the Sherman Act in
determining the jurisdictional limit of the NLRA.
36. Id. at 783-84.
37. Id.
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fore, since firms representing only local clients were found to affect commerce,

it would follow logically that firms representing large national companies
would affect commerce. As the Goldfarb Court noted, "[i]n the modern world
it cannot be denied that the activities of lawyers play an important part in
"38
commercial intercourse ....
Despite this broad interpretation of the commerce clause as it applies to the
practice of law, -two arguments can be raised against the validity of the Board's
jurisdiction: the learned profession exemption and the doctrine of state
immunity. Although, as will be discussed below, both arguments arose in the
context of the Sherman Act, courts have traditionally treated jurisdictional
issues arising under both the Sherman Act and the NLRA in a similar
manner. 39 The notion of a learned profession exemption derives from dictum
in a case which exempted major league baseball from the proscriptions of the
Sherman Act. 40 The Supreme Court declared that "a firm of lawyers sending
out a member to argue a case

. . .

does not engage in [interstate] commerce

because the lawyer . . . goes to another State. ' 4 1 Whatever authority may
have existed for a learned profession exemption, however, seems to have been
overturned by the Goldfarb decision, which rejected the argument that the
learned professions are not trade or commerce and found that the nature of an
occupation would not provide automatic "sanctuary" from the Sherman
Act. 42 In addition, even if lawyers were exempt as members of a learned
profession, the exemption would still not extend to paralegals and administrative and support personnel.
The state action immunity doctrine derives from Parkerv. Brown.4 3 There,
38. Id. at 788. Numerous activities of lawyers affect interstate commerce. Labor strife at a
law firm specializing in corporate law could affect commerce by delaying the flow of millions of
dollars involved in various business transactions. A strike by employees of a labor law firm could
delay settlement of a client's labor relations problems, resulting in the possible loss of interstate
business. Note, in addition, that the Board need not consider the impact of only one law firm, but
rather the total impact on commerce from potential labor disputes at all law firms. NLRB v.
Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1939).
39. See notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
40. Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of Prof. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
41. Id. at 209. See also FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931) (doctors "follow a
profession and not a trade"). The exemption was also supported by dictum in a case which held
that cleaners were tradesmen who were subject to the Sherman Act rather than learned
professionals. Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932). "Wherever
any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or
livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly called a trade." Id.
at 436 (quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388)).
42. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
43. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The genesis of the state action doctrine, as the Parker Court noted, is
found in the earlier cases of Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904), and Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F.
908 (D.S.C. 1895). Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 352. In Olsen, a state statute limiting the
pilotage business to licensed pilots and prohibiting unlicensed pilots from engaging in this trade
was upheld. In Lowenstein, the Court upheld the validity of a state liquor monopoly preventing
the sale of distilled spirits within the state by private persons. See Note, Parker v. Brown
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the Supreme Court refused to enjoin, as violative of the Sherman Act, the
enforcement of a state marketing program which established standard grades
44
of raisins and fixed prices of those grades for all raisins grown in California.
The Court found that the program did not "operate by force of individual
agreement or combination... [and] derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state .... ." Since the purpose of the Sherman
Act was to prevent only private business combinations, 4 6 and not to restrain
47
state action, the state program was found not violative of the Sherman Act.
If, then, the Sherman Act prohibits private activities in restraint of trade and
does not reach state activities, 48 employers can argue that because the legal
profession is regulated by the courts of each state, the state action doctrine
precludes NLRB jurisdiction over law firms. 49
Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898
(1977).
44. 317 U.S. at 351-52. The Court reached this conclusion in spite of the fact that one-half of
the world crop of raisins was produced in California and the fact that between 90 and 95% of the
raisins grown there were shipped out of state. Id. at 345. It must be noted, however, that the
state law in question was not inconsistent with federal law. Id. at 352-59. The Court stated that
Congress could have prohibited a state from maintaining such a program because of its effect on
interstate commerce. Id. at 350.
45. Id. at 350.
46. Alphin v. Henson, 392 F. Supp. 813, 826 (D. Md. 1975).
47. 317 U.S. at 352. "The state in adopting and enforcing the [standard grading and
price-fixing] program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint
of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government
which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." Id.
48. Id. One authority has noted the impropriety of referring to the decision in Parker v.
Brown as an immunity or exemption doctrine since the Court specifically found no congressional
intent to extend the scope of the Sherman Act beyond private actions to "restrain a state or its
officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. Thus, by statutory
construction, the Court avoided confronting the constitutional question of state immunity or
exemption. See Handler, The CurrentAttack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1976). See also E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc. v. Massachusetts Port
Authority, 362 F.2d 52, 56 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 947 (1966) ("[W]e do not reach the
question of immunity, since there was no attempt on the part of Congress to impose liability In
the first place.').
49. In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a
violation of the state bar disciplinary rule against lawyer advertising was not subject to attack
under the Sherman Act since such disciplinary action was "compelled by the state acting as a
sovereign." Id. at 2697-98 (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)).
State action was present since the Court found that the "real party in interest" was the Arizona
Supreme Court and not the state bar which acted "as the agent of the Court under its continuous
supervision." Id. at 2697. (Despite its finding of immunity from the Sherman Act, the Court
struck down the disciplinary rule on the ground that the advertisement in question fell within the
protection of the first amendment. Id. at 2708-09.) Bates can be distinguished on the ground that
no element of state compulsion is present in private law firm labor practices. See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra. See also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which
the Court noted "that there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress . . . ." Id. at 845.
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The Goldfarb Court, however, rejected this argument with respect to the
anticompetitive effects of the minimum fee schedules of the state bar association.50 The state bar might be a state agency for some limited purposes, and
therefore anticompetitive conduct might be "prompted" by state action; but
for the state action exemption to apply, "activities must be compelled by
direction of the State acting as a sovereign." 5' A state cannot immunize
private anticompetitive activity merely by authorizing or approving such
conduct. 52 Just as the anticompetitive activities of the lawyers in the Goldfarb
case were not compelled by direction of the state acting as a sovereign, neither
are labor practices of law firms compelled by the state. Aside from the state's
having set minimum licensing requirements for those persons who can be
employed as attorneys, there is no element of state compulsion as to the hiring
and firing of law firm employees, or to the terms and conditions of their
employment.
I.

SHOULD

THE

BOARD ASSERT JURISDICTION OVER

LAw FIRMS AS A CLASS?

Even when the activities of a class of employers are found to affect
commerce, the Board has the discretion to decline jurisdiction where the
purposes of the NLRA would not be advanced substantially by an assertion
of jurisdiction over those employers.5 3 The primary factor in such a discretionary decision by the Board usually is whether a labor dispute in the
trade or industry in question would have a "sufficiently substantial" effect on
commerce. 5 4 A secondary factor, which has been raised in the
particular
55
context of law firm employees, is the issue of confidentiality.
A. Substantial Effect on Commerce
In two early decisions, the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over private
law firms on the ground that there was a "minimal . . . degree of impact

on interstate commerce of potential labor disputes between law firms and
their employees ....
,,s6 In Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Roth50. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
51. Id.

773, 791 (1975).

52. Id. ("The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes does not
create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its
members."). See also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 591 (1976); Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 389 (19S 1),
the Court held that state participation in private conduct is also insufficient to constitute state
action.
53. NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970). Congress enacted this provsion in the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (1959), to give explicit
approval to the Board's discretionary declination of jurisdiction. See R. Gorman, supra note 31,
at 23.
54. NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
55. See pt. III(B) infra.
56. Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512, 514 (1973). See also
Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1216 (1972). In Evans, the Board limited its decision to
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schild, 57 a Teamsters Union local sought to organize a labor law firm's clerical
staff and petitioned the Board for a representation election. The employer
firm earned annual gross revenues in excess of $50,000 for legal services
performed for clients who met the Board's jurisdictional standards, and the
total income of the firm was in excess of $500,000.5 s The Board noted that it
had discretion to decline jurisdiction under section 14(c)(1) and denied the
union's request for an election, the major consideration being "whether the
stoppage of business by reason of labor strife would tend substantially to
affect commerce." 5 9 Although it conceded that law firms do affect commerce, 60 the Board concluded that the firm's connection with commerce was
indirect and incidental, and that the attorney was merely a "helper" to his
client, "who is the moving force in commerce." 6 1 The Board also concluded
that the advice and services rendered by lawyers were related to law rather
the facts of the case. The law firm involved consisted of four to six attorneys who practiced
almost entirely within the state. Although the Board declined to assert jurisdiction on grounds of
insubstantial impact on commerce, it did note that the firm furnished legal services valued In
excess of $50,000 to clients who themselves met the jurisdictional standards of the Board and that
therefore the Board could have asserted jurisdiction.
Only in the case of two classes of businesses, real estate brokers and racetracks, does the Board
still decline jurisdiction. In Seattle Real Estate Bd., 130 N.L.R.B. 608 (1961), the Board found
that the services performed by a real estate broker have only a remote relationship to interstate
commerce, since a broker merely functions as one bringing together the buyer and seller of real
property, an "essentially local" function. Id. at 610. The Board stated that the broker does not
handle financing of the sale, which might involve out-of-state transactions and creates a more
direct impact on interstate commerce. Id. On these grounds, the holding can be distinguished
from Goldfarb and may survive that decision.
In Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 388 (1959), the Board found an insubstantial
effect on commerce by reason of the local nature of racetrack operations and the high degree of
state control over such operations. Id. at 391. See also Centennial Turf Club, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B.
698 (1971); Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R1B. 744, 747 (1962). Nevertheless, the Board recently
asserted jurisdiction over another form of gambling operation in Volusia Jai Alai, Inc., 221
N.L.R.B. 1280 (1975). The Board distinguished the jai alai industry from the horseracing
industry because of the differing nature of employment in the two industries. In the case of
horseracing "the sporadic nature of the employment ... rninimiz[es] the impact on commerce,"
whereas the jai alai industry was found to have a stable work force with stable hours and tenure.
Id. at 1281-82. In another case, the Board asserted jurisdiction over gambling casinos. See El
Dorado, Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 579 (1965).
57. 206 N.L.R.B. 512 (1973).
58. Id. at 512.
59. Id. at 513 (quoting Service Stores Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1162-63 (1945)).
60. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
61. 206 N.L.R.B. at 513. The Board reached this conclusion in spite of its recognition that
law firms today "frequently assist large corporate entities . . . in their interstate commerce
activity. Thus the guiding hand of the lawyer can, and in many instances does, assist in the
negotiation and ultimate formulation of complex interstate agreements relating to trade and
business." Id. The Board apparently did not consider the fact that, if a law firm were crippled by
its own labor problems, an attorney would be unable to assist his client and would thereby
prevent the client from conducting some of its interstate activities. See notes 34-38 supra and
accompanying text.
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than to commerce. Law firms were distinguished "from entities such as
engineering firms, architectural firms, or advertising firms, whose services
relate directly to commerce.1 62 The Board failed to explain the reasoning
behind this distinction among professions, however. The distinction that the
Bodle majority attempted to make between law firms, on the one hand, and
engineering, architectural, and advertising firms on the other, apparently
results from the Board's erroneous definition of commerce as manufacturing,
construction, or sales activity. 63 The dissent, however, pointed out that the
Board has always taken jurisdiction over employers who furnish services to
other enterprises engaged in interstate commerce even when the employer is
furnishing intangible services to the interstate enterprises."
The Bodle decision divided the Board by a 3-2 vote, and the two dissenters
vigorously criticized the majority ruling. 6s Arguing that clients would not be
able to engage in interstate commerce without the services of lawyers, the
dissent stated:
Without the services of the legal profession, American business as we know it today
could not function. The legal profession plays a vital role at all stages from the act of
incorporation through the obtaining of licenses or certificates which might be needed,
governmental approval of rates and/or routes, the issuance and sale of stocks and
bonds, the negotiations and preparation of legal contracts necessary for the holding of
property, and the purchase and sale of materials and products, to name but a few
aspects .... 66
In addition, the recent increase in the quantity of corporate litigation and
class action suits also points to the greater potential of lawyers to affect
commerce. 67
The dissent's argument prevailed four years later in Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 68
where the Board overruled Bodle and unanimously decided to assert jurisdiction over law firms as69 a class, subject to their meeting an appropriate
jurisdictional standard.
62.

206 N.L.R.B. at 513; see note 71 iyfra and accompanying text.

63.

See Recent Decision, 7 Loy. U.L.A.L. Rev. 385, 389 n.32 (1974); note 71 infra and

accompanying text.
64. 206 N.L.R.B. at 515 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
65. See id. at 514 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
66. Id. at 515 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
67. See Bernstein, The IVal Street Lawyers Are Thriving on Change, Fortune, Mar. 1978, at
104-08; Caruth, The Legal Explosion Has Left Business Shell-Shocked, Fortune, Apr. 1973, at
64.
68. 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 18,116 (May4, 1977). The firm
consisted of approximately 60 attorneys and 150 employees in total. A group of file room clerks
and messengers for the firm, who belonged to an in-house labor organization, filed a petition for a
representation election. The petition was dismissed by the Regional Director on the basis of the
Bodle decision, but the petitioner requested a review of the Bodle decision based on the Supreme
Court's holding in Goldfarb. See Request for Review of the Decision of the Acting Regional
Director at 2, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
18,116 (May 4, 1977).

69.

Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CChI) i 18,116, at
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The Board adopted the Bodle dissent's reasoning that law firms very
directly and immediately affect commerce 70 and noted that it had previously
asserted jurisdiction over employers engaged in furnishing intangible services
to enterprises engaged in interstate commerce. 71 In reversing its opinion on
the question of substantiality, the Board analyzed the applicability of
Goldfarb,7 2 and found that the word "commerce" as used by the Supreme
30,069 (May 4, 1977). The jurisdictional standard was subsequently determined to be $250,000 In
gross annual revenues. Camden Regional Legal Servs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 47, [1977-78] 3
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,430 (Aug. 8, 1977). The Board stated that this standard would enable It
"to exercise jurisdiction over that part of the industry which exerts a substantial impact on
commerce without unduly burdening the Board's processes by involving it in a multitude of
cases whose total economic significance is slight." Id. (footnote omitted). That the Board may soon
reconsider this amount, and set a higher one, is suggested by the fact that the employer in Hughes
Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725, slip op. at 1 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied, 251
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977), stipulated to gross revenues in excess of $1,000,000.
It is important to note that if the Board does decline jurisdiction, the employees are not left
totally without recourse, since state courts or agencies may then assert jurisdiction. One reason
for the enactment of NLRA § 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(ZJ, was to eliminate the "no-man's land"
that had been created in cases where an employer affects commerce, but the Board has decided
not to assert jurisdiction. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), had held that
Congress, by vesting in the Board jurisdiction over labor relations matters affecting commerce,
had intended to preempt state power, even in cases where the Board declined to assert
jurisdiction, unless the Board had expressly ceded its jurisdiction to the states pursuant to NLRA
§ 10(a). See note 31 supra. Congress passed NLRA § 14(c)(2) to remedy this deficiency.
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701, 73 Stat. 519, 541 (1959). This section
provides that a state court or agency is not barred from asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes
when the Board has declined jurisdiction.
70. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) T 18,116, at
30,068 (May 4, 1977) (quoting Bodie, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. 512,
515 (1973) (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting)).
71. Id. The Supreme Court has held that the sale of personal services, as well as commodities, is trade. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957)
(football player); American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943) (group
health plan). In addition, the Board has asserted its jurisdiction over numerous employers
furnishing intangible services to other employers engaged in interstate commerce. See Truman
Schlup, 145 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963) (engineering and surveying services); Browne & Buford, 145
N.L.R.B. 765 (1963) (surveying, design, and inspection services); Hazelton Laboratories, Inc.,
136 N.L.R.B. 1609 (1962) (research and development services); DeLeuw, Cather & Co., 72
N.L.R.B. 191 (1947) (appraisal, investigation, and surveys of property services); Electrical
Testing Laboratories, Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1946) (testing of electrical products); Salmon &
Cowin, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B. 845 (1944), aff'd, 148 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 758
(1945) (appraising of mining property); W. J. Cochrane, 44 N.L.R.B. 617 (1942) (analyzing metal
ores); U.S. Testing Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 696 (1938) (chemical and physical analysis of commodities).
In addition, jurisdiction also has very recently been asserted over a nonprofit corporation engaged
in the operation of a rehabilitation and training center for the mentally retarded, see Kent County
Ass'n, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 222 (1977), and over a charitable corporation that provided health and
welfare services, see Mon Valley United Health Servs., 227 N.L.R.B. No. 114 (1977).
72. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Foley Board echoed the
Supreme Court's finding that "the activities of lawyers play an important part in commercial
intercourse." 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 30,069 (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975)).
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Court in determining jurisdiction in that case was "equally applicable" to
determining jurisdiction under the NLRA. 73 Since both Acts apply only to
those activities that result in more than an incidental or indirect effect on
interstate commerce, and the purpose of both Acts is to prevent obstructions
of commerce, 74 the Supreme Court's conclusion in Goldfarb that lawyers and
law firms do exert a substantial impact on commerce was persuasive authority
for the Board's change of position in Foley.
In effect, the Board in Foley did not reject the strict test for the Board's
jurisdiction promulgated in Bodle. The Bodle Board was concerned with
whether labor strife in a law firm would tend to substantially affect commerce. 7s The Foley Board found such a "substantial" effect on interstate
commerce on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in Goldfarb.76 Since
the Supreme Court had found that the activities of lawyers substantially affect
interstate commerce, the Board concluded that the disruption of legal services
caused by a labor dispute would also substantially affect interstate com77
merce.

In sum, the Board had ample grounds for its discretionary decision to assert
jurisdiction over law firms as a class, because of their substantial impact on
commerce. However, substantiality of effect on commerce is not the only
discretionary factor the Board may consider in determining whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a particular class. In cases involving law firms,
issues of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege have been asserted as
additional discretionary factors to be weighed.
B. Confidentiality
The Board has frequently mentioned the problem of confidentiality in
connection with unionization in law firms but has not adequately analyzed or
resolved the issues involved. 78 Much of the confusion surrounding this issue
73. 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-781 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 30,069. juln regulating labor
relations under the Act, the Congress intended to exercise fully the same plenary and comprehensive commerce power which it had exercised in regulating commerce under the Sherman Act." Id.
(quoting Van Camp Sea Food Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 537 (1974)).
74. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38-40 (1937); NLRB v. Gonzalez Padin Co., 161 F.2d 353, 355 (1st Cir. 1947).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has also been construed to encompass law firms in its definition
of commerce. See Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 59 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
496 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
75. 206 N.L.R.B. at 513.
76. 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 30,069.
77. Id.; see notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text. The Foley decision was bolstered by
the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over proprietary hospitals in Butte Medical Properties, 168
N.L.R.B. 266 (1967). The Board's previous policy of declining jurisdiction was based on its
finding of an insubstantial impact on commerce because of the local character of such hospitals.
In rejecting this argument, the Board found that "[o]perationally, [hospitals] are a multibillion
dollar complex and, as such, compromise [sic] one of the largest industries in the United States.
. . . [They] influence and affect commerce beyond their immediate individual confines." Id. at
267.
78. See Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH)
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lies in the failure to distinguish between the broad issue of confidentiality
arising from conflicts of interest and breach of the attorney-client confidential
relationship, and the Board's more narrow concept of "confidential employee." '79 The mere fact that an employee has access to confidential information does not render him a confidential employee within the meaning of Board
precedent. 80 Nevertheless, the law firms argue that unionization will create
such conflicts of interest for the employees that serious breaches both of the
evidentiary attorney-client privilege"1 and of the broader ethical duty of the
attorney to protect the confidences and secrets of his client 82 are likely to
result, and therefore, that all law firm employees should be deemed confidential employees.
1. The Law Firms' Argument of Confidentiality
The confidentiality problems envisioned by the employer law firms were
carefully delineated in the briefs filed by two law firms involved in labor
18,116, at 30,069 (May 4, 1977); Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B.
512, 513-14 (1973); Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216, 1218 (1972). See also Hughes

Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977).

79. See Brief for the Employed, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept.
review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977); Brief in Support of
Employer's Opposition to Petitioner's Request for Review, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B.
No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCII)
18,116 (May 4, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Foley
30, 1977),

Employer's Brief].
80. See notes 86-92 infra and accompanying text.
81. Brief for the Employer, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30,
1977), review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977); Brief in Support of
Employer's Opposition to Petitioner's Request for Review, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B.
No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 18,116 (May 4, 1977).
In order to promote the administration of justice, it has long been recognized that it is
necessary to provide clients with the opportunity to disclose information and problems confidentially to their attorneys. See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 833 (1956); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2294, 2306, 2310, 2317 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). This confidential relationship between attorney and client is protected by the attorneyclient evidentiary privilege. Id. § 2292, at 554. Observance of this privilege is required by the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 4-1, EC 4-2. The privilege also applies to the
employees of the attorney. The courts have recognized that the complexities of modern practice
create a situation in which few lawyers can function without the assistance of secretaries, file
clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and various other
aides. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961). See also 8 J. Wigmore, supra
§ 2301, at 583. In addition, the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes an even wider
obligation to maintain confidentiality by providing for an affirmative duty on the part of the
lawyer to exercise reasonable diligence to prevent disclosure by his employees. ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(D). Note that paralegal associations are also proposing
codes of ethics for their profession. See American Paralegal Association National Steering
Committee, Code of Ethics for Legal Assistants; National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.,
Code of Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, reprinted in N. Shayne, The Paralegal Profession
apps. II & I1 (1977).
82. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B).
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organizational activity.8 3 Examples of possible breaches of attorney-client
relationship arising from the division of employee loyalty between the union
the law firm included the following situations: (1) An employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement containing a "just cause" and grievance
arbitration provision is discharged for disclosing a client's confidential or
secret information. If the employee challenged his discharge, the employer
would have to disclose the confidential or secret information to defend his
claim of "just cause" for discharging the employee. Doing so would be a
breach of his duty to his client.8 4 (2) An employee handles certain documents
relating to tender offers or corporate acquisitions. He then divulges the
information to his labor organization, which uses the information with regard
5
to investments for its pension plan.
The above examples assume that a real conflict of interest would be caused
by the division of employee loyalties between his labor representative and his
employer. Many different types of employees, however, in a wide variety of
occupations, have already been organized under the NLRA, despite the fact
that they have access to confidential information concerning clients and other
third parties. Employees with confidential information about their employer's
production, sales, or trade secrets have been held to be within the Board's
jurisdiction. 8 6 Employees with knowledge of their employer's clients have
83. Brief for the Employer, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30,
1977), review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-I (Dec. 29, 1977); Foley Employer's Brief,
supra note 79.

84. Foley Employer's Brief, supra note 79, at 18; see Sinclair Refining Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d
569, 571 (5th Cir. 1962) (the employer is under a duty to furnish the union with requested
information which is "necessary to enable the parties to administer the contact and resolve
grievances or disputes). A related problem is the situation in which an employer claims financial
inability to meet a wage demand during the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. He
must substantiate that claim upon the request of a bargaining representative. NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). Such substantiation might involve disclosure of a firm's
income and costs, including specific information about the fees a client pays the firm, information
the client might deem confidential. Foley Employer's Brief, supra note 79, at 19. Note, however,
that the Truitt decision does not dictate that employees are always entitled to having evidence
substantiated. The facts of each case will determine whether, and to what extent, the employer
must divulge proof of inability to meet union demands. 351 U.S. at 153-54.
85. Foley Employer's Brief, supra note 79, at 18. The Securities and Exchange Commission
recently noted: "It has come to the attention of the Commission that in certain instances law firm
personnel may have abused their position of trust and confidence . . . by revealing such
information to others who have engaged in securities transactions on the basis of such information.... Law firms... have an affirmative obligation to safeguard such information." SEC
Exchange Act Release No. 13437, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,116(Apr. 8,
1977). See also Bernstein, supra note 67, at 112.
Other examples cited by the Foley Employer's Brief at Appendix C include the following
situations that might give rise to a conflict of interest or breach of attorney-client privilege: (1) the
labor organization, its supporters, or affiliates might have collective bargaining relations with the
employer's clients; (2) the union might be engaged in the activity of organizing the employees of
an employer's client.
86. See Sargent & Co., 95 N.L.RB. 1515 (1951).
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been included, 8 7 as have employees of a credit bureau who had access to
confidential data concerning the Bureau's customers.88 In another case,
analogous to the law firm situation, the Board approved a bargaining unit
even though the employer association's business included developing and
implementing labor relations policies for its member employers. 8 9 In that
case, the Board specifically rejected the employer's argument that its workers
were confidential employees. 90 Most importantly, the Board has previously
directed elections for units composed of lawyers. 91 Moreover, the Board has
continually affirmed the principle that union membership may not be viewed
as a threat to the loyalty of an employee to his employer:
The law has clearly rejected the notion that membership in a labor organization is in
itself incompatible with the obligations of fidelity owed to an employer by its
employees. To the contrary, employees placed in positions of trust by employers
engaged in a wide variety of financial activities have exercised their fundamental rights
guaranteed
by the Act without raising the spectre of divided loyalty or compromised
92
trust.

87. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 549, 554 (1948). The employees in this case
often received confidential information concerning both the customer's business and labor
relations. See also Remington Rand Inc., 71 N.L.R.B. 626, 627-28 (1946) (employees who have
access to confidential information from the employer's customers are neither confidential nor
managerial employees).
88. Credit Bureau, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B. 410, 412-13 (1947). The employees assisted in the
preparation of credit, personnel, and other reports for the clients of the employer. The Board
rejected the employer's claim of confidentiality, noting that the employees were all warned against
divulging information on penalty of discharge, and also rejected the employer's argument that the
sources of the information required to prepare the reports would be reluctant to disclose necessary
facts to a member of a labor organization. Employees of Dun & Bradstreet have twice been held
entitled to the protections of the NLRA despite the fect that they have access to extremely
sensitive and privileged information about most of the nation's financial and corporate institutions. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 9 (1971); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B.
56, 58-59 (1948). In the 1971 case, the employer contended that "the unauthorized acquisition of
confidential credit reports by unions and others has in the past caused some sources to withhold
information previously furnished." 194 N.L.R.B. at 10. But the Board found that the employer
had failed to cite a case in which one employee had compromised a report. Id. Other employees
covered by the NLRA include: accountants and auditors, Armstrong Rubber Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
1115 (1963); brokerage house employees, Goodbody & Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 81 (1970); insurance
agents and adjusters, Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 982 (1968); messengers who carry
confidential documents, Mississippi Prods., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 873 (1948); and health care
employees subject to the doctor-patient privilege, Eljer Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1417 (1954), even
though all have access to confidential information relating to their employer's clients or customers.
89. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 185 N.L.R.B. 780 (1970).
90. Id. at 780-81.
91. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl, 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 930-31 (1951) (attorneys employed by a
labor organization); Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948) (attorneys employed by an insurance company). In Lumbermen's the Board rejected the employer's argument
that an attorney-client relationship existed between it and its employees that would preclude the
existence of an employer-employee relationship. 75 N.L.R.B. at 1137.
92. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 9, 9-10 (1971) (footnote omitted). See also Credit
Bureau, Inc., 73 N.L.R.B. 410, 412 n.2 (1947).
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Consequently, it seems that the Board will reject the law firms' broad
argument that the inherent nature of the attorney-client relationship gives rise
to serious conflict of interest problems which justify a general exclusion of law
firm employees on confidentiality grounds.
2.

The Board's Definition of "Confidential Employee"
The concept of confidential employee raises a more substantial ground upon
which the Board might decline jurisdiction over some law firms. Although
there is no statutory exclusion of "confidential employees" from the coverage
of the NLRA, the Board has held, nevertheless, that employees who in the
regular course of their duties have access to confidential data bearing directly
upon the employer's labor relations policies should be excluded. 93 The classic
example of a confidential employee is the secretary to the company's vice
president in charge of labor relations. 94 The rationale for this exclusion is that
access to a company's confidential labor relations information would place
such an employee in a potential conflict of interest situation. 95 In order to
prevent the definition of confidential employee from being too inclusive, the
Board decided to "limit the term 'confidential' so as to embrace only those
employees who assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who
exercise 'managerial' functions in the field of labor relations." 96 The purpose
of this limitation was to prevent many employees from needlessly being
deprived of their rights under the NLRA. 97 As the Board stated in Pacific
Maritime Association:98 "we find that only employees who assist and act in a
confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate
management labor relations policies affecting directly the Employer's own
employees are confidential employees . . . ."99 According to this definition,
law firm employees could not be held to be confidential employees unless
they assisted in the determination of their employer law firm's policies.
3.

The Board's Analysis in Private Law Firm Cases
In none of the three private law firm cases decided thus far has the Board
adequately distinguished the two separate aspects of the confidentiality prob93.

NLRB v. Quaker City Life Ins. Co., 319 F.2d 690, 694 (4th Cir. 1963). The Supreme

Court, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.

267,

283-84 n.12

(1974),

noted that

Congress

intended to exclude confidential employees from the coverage of the NLRA although that
intention was not reflected in the express statutory language.
94. R. Gorman, supra note 31, at 39.
95. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669, 670 (6th Cir. 1969) (citing Retail
Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642, 645 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1966), ceri. denied, 386 U.S. 1017
(1967)).
96. Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946). See also B.F. Goodrich Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 722, 724 (1956).
97. Thus, the Board has ruled, for example, that an employee may not be excluded because
he has access to confidential information concerning the employer's internal business operations.
Swift & Co., 129 N.L.RtB. 1391, modified on other grounds, 131 N.L.R.B. 1143 (1961);
Dohrmann Commercial Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 205 (1960).
98. 185 N.L.R.B. 780 (1970).
99. Id. at 780-81.
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lem: the Board's narrow definition of a "confidential employee," and the
broader issues raised by the law firms. It is clear that the Board will exclude
only "confidential employees," but it appears possible that future decisions of
the Board may broaden that category somewhat to include certain law firm
employees.
Dictum in Bodle provides a good example of the Board members' confusion
on the confidentiality issue. 100 The majority seemed to fear that conflicts of
interest which could lead to a disruption of the "peculiarly delicate and
confidential" 10 1 attorney-client relationship were likely to arise if the law
firm's employees were represented by organizations which might have interests contrary to the interests of the law firm's clients. 102 The Board, therefore,
stated:
For reasons paralleling those which have led us to exclude confidential employees from

bargaining units generally, we would hesitate to certify that a unit of law firm
employees is appropriate for collective bargaining when such a unit must of necessity
include employees with access to information
coming within the peculiarly confidential
relationship between lawyer and client. 10 3
The majority in Bodle, therefore, seemed to be accepting the broader confidentiality argument of the law firms. They would not exclude specific employees
under the Board's confidential employee test but rather would expand the
exclusionary category to embrace all law firm employees because of their
''access to information coming within the peculiarly confidential relationship
between lawyer and client." 1 0 4 The dissent, however, specifically rejected the
contention that employees in a law firm are in any way analogous to
confidential employees, noting that the Board had already rejected in another
case the argument that the confidential relationship between the attorney and
client dictates precluding attorneys from the protection of the NLRA. 105
Three members of the Board, then, would have excluded law firm employees
as some sort of confidential employee, while two members would not.
100. 206 N.L.R.B. 512. In Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972), the first case In
which the Board considered the question of jurisdiction over law firms, the Trial Examiner noted
that one reason for declining jurisdiction over law firms was that the exercise of jurisdiction could
lead to problems with the "well-established absolute privilege covering attorney-client communications." Id. at 1218. He conceded, nevertheless, that legal secretaries are not "confidential
employees" as defined by the Board. Id- The Board, however, did not mention the confidentiality issue in its decision. Note, however, that the discussions of confidentiality in both cases were
dicta since the Board declined jurisdiction in both Evans and Bodle on other grounds. See notes
56-61 supra and accompanying text.
101. 206 N.L.R.B. at 513-14.
102. Id. at 514. The law firm involved in B4dle, for example, represented one union that
competed with the labor organization that was seeking to represent the law firm's employees,
103. Id. (emphasis supplied).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 516 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting). The case referred to was
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948), in which the Board had found that
attorneys working for an insurance company were not confidential employees because they were
not directly or indirectly concerned with the employer's labor relations policies. See note 91 supra
and accompanying text.
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In Foley the Board made a partially successful attempt to resolve the
issue. 10 6 The Board still did not clearly distinguish between the two aspects of
the confidentiality problem, but did suggest a case-by-case approach for
dealing with the issue. ' 0 7 Although a unanimous opinion, the members of the
Board remained divided in their concern about the confidentiality problem.
Three members clearly stated that they would not treat law firm employees
differently from any other group of employees.108 A majority of the Board,
therefore, would continue to exclude only confidential employees as defined by
the Board. The remaining two members, however, regarded the position of
employees in labor law firms to be analogous to confidential employees. They
reasoned that law firm attorneys who participate in the client's labor relations
policies perform the function of labor relations officials and can therefore be
considered confidential employees.' 0 9
Because the Board stated that it would deal with the problem of confidentiality on a case-by-case basis in the context of determining an appropriate
bargaining unit, Members Murphy and Walther concurred in the decision to
assert jurisdiction over the employees of law firms. 10 It seems, then, that the
Board has rejected the broader concept of confidentiality which was suggested
by dictum in Bodle, and has reverted to a more traditional meaning of
confidential employee as one who has access to labor relations information. In
addition, however, the Board has indicated that the concept may be
broadened to include not only employees assisting in the formulation of the
direct employer's labor relations policies but also those assisting in the
formulation of the client's labor relations policies."' The Board's
continued reference to the broader problem of confidentiality indicates that
there is still sufficient concern with this problem, in the context of private
law firms, to lead the Board to justify some special consideration for law firm
2
employees. "1
Since the Board has discretion to "place appropriate limitations on the
choice of bargaining representatives should it find that public or statutory
policy so dictate,"'1 3 the Board can determine on a case-by-case basis whether
or not the choice of a particular union will create potentially serious conflict of
interest problems. That approach led to the rejection of the confidentiality
argument in the Hughes Hubbard & Reed opinion by a Regional Director." 14 She found no proof that "any of the Employer's attorneys participate in
the formulation and effectuation of their clients' labor relations policies so as
106.
107.

See 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) at 30,069-70 n.12.
See id.

108.

Id. at 30,069 n.12 (Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Penello).

109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.

at 30,069-70 n.12.

112. Although the three members stated that they would not treat law firm employees
differently, they seemed to concur in the case-by-case approach. Id.
113.
114.

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1947).
Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied,

251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977).
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to make them 'confidential employees' within the meaning of Board precedent."1 5 This conclusion was reached despite the fact that the union seeking
to organize Hughes Hubbard & Reed's employees was an affiliate of the
International Longshoreman's Association and that one of the employer's6
clients had a bargaining relationship with the Longshoreman's Association. "1
The Regional Director noted that the firm's only labor relations work con1
sisted of advising clients with respect to employee benefit programs. 17
Thus, the Board in Foley and the Regional Director in Hughes Hubbard &
Reed have clearly rejected the argument that possible breaches of attorneyclient privilege or conflict of interest should lead to a general exclusion of all
law firm employees."" It seems possible, however, that a future decision
might exclude all attorneys, or even all employees, of a law firm with a
substantial labor practice. 9 Members Murphy and Walther have accepted
the fiction that an attorney is actually employed by the client and therefore
becomes a "confidential employee" of the client when he engages in labor
relations work for the client.1 20 Members Murphy and Walther have further
argued that when administrative and paralegal assistants to the attorneys
assist them in labor relations matters, "they-no less than aides of labor
relations officials-are arguably 'confidential employees.' 1121 This analysis
115. Id., slip op. at 2 (footnote omitted).
116. Id., slip op. at I n.2.
117. Id., slip op. at 1-2. In a footnote, however, the Regional Director stated that because she
had already dismissed the petition, it was unnecessary to consider whether any of the employer's
legal staff did participate in client labor relations policie;, and whether their secretaries assisted
them so as to be confidential employees within the meaning of Board precedent. Id., slip op. at 6
n. 10. It is unclear why she stated this, in light of her statement in the text of her opinion that she
failed to find any proof that the firm's employees participated in the formulation of client's labor
relations policies. See id., slip op. at 1-2. Perhaps she was merely attempting to avoid providing
any definitive answers to the confidentiality problem.
118. Foley, Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 18,116
(May 4, 1977); Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review
denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977).
119. In Hughes Hubbard & Reed, the Regional Director mentioned the concern over the
confidential relationship between attorney and client, but directed her attention solely to the
practice of labor law, citing the note in Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc,, 229
N.L.R.B. No. 171, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. $ 18,229, at 30,264 n.7 (May 27, 1977), to the effect
that the attorneys in that case did not formulate or effectuate the labor relations policies of their
clients. Id., slip op. at 2 & n.4.
Since 10 to 15% of Foley, Hoag & Eliot's practice consisted of labor relations, it appears that
the Board will be concerned only if more than that percentage of the practice is labor relations.
See Request for Review of the Decision of the Acting Regional Director, Exhibit A, at 2, Foley,
Hoag & Eliot, 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 18,116 (May 4, 1977).
120. Note, however, that Members Murphy and Walther are most concerned with this
problem. Chairman Fanning and Members Jenkins and Penello seem to regard the problem as
too speculative and would not treat law firm employees differently from any other group of
employees. Although the private law firm decisions so far have not involved attorneys, perhaps
some of the broader notions of breach of attorney-client privilege will influence them at least to
place attorneys in labor law firms in the confidential employee category.
121. 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 18,116, at 30,069 n. 12. It Is
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would result in an expansion of the Board's definition of confidential employees: the determinative facts would not be simply the direct employer's labor
relations practices, but would include those of the clients. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that the Board will not issue a general exclusion of law firm
employees based upon the "peculiarly confidential nature" of the attorneyclient relationship. Instead, the Board will exclude only those employees who
can arguably be classified as confidential employees within the established
Board meaning of that term.
IV. THE DETERMINATION OF AN APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT
As an incident to conducting a representation election, the Board must
decide which group of jobs or job classifications will comprise an appropriate
collective bargaining unit. 122 Typically, the employer will favor large units
because the union will find organizing a greater number of employees in a
greater number of job classifications more difficult, thus decreasing the labor
organization's chances of demonstrating a sufficient showing of interest to the
Board.1 23 The Board has the option of selecting any one of several bargaining
units that might be appropriate because the statute requires only that the
representative selected be chosen "by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for [collective bargaining] purposes."' 24 In making its determinaless likely that such reasoning would be employed to exclude administrative and support
employees. See 206 N.L.R.B. at 517 (Members Fanning and Penello dissenting).
122.

N.L.R.A. § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) provides: "The Board shall decide in each

case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit [is] appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
.... See generally J. Abodeely, The NLRB and the Appropriate Bargaining Unit (1971).
In addition, upon receipt of a petition for an election by a labor organization, the organization
must demonstrate that there is a sufficient probability that the employees have selected that
organization to represent it. Such a showing of interest will be satisfied upon a showing that
the petitioner has been designated by at least 30 percent of the employees. 29 C.F.R.
§ 101.18(a) (1977); see Rubin & Kane, 170 N.L.R.B. 466, 466 n.2 (1968); SL Louis Independent
Parking Co., 169 N.L.R-B. 1106, 1107 (1968); Winn-DLxie Stores, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 908, 909
(1959).
123. The employer will also favor larger units, rather than several fragmented units, because
he will have fewer negotiations to engage in. Moreover, with one large unit, the employer will not
be inhibited in assigning employees to different job classifications that might be in different units
with possibly different bargaining representatives. A larger unit, containing employees with
different skills, attitudes, and interests will also create a situation in which the union will have a
more difficult task in fairly negotiating and administering a collective bargaining agreement. It
will also create organizational obstacles for the union in the sense that paralegals, for example,
may not desire to be grouped together with the xerographic copying machine operators in a law
firm. See generally R. Gorman, supra note 31, ch. 5, § 1.
The significance of the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit was emphasized in
Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137 (1962), in which the Board stated: 'ITIhe
scope of the unit is basic to and permeates the whole of the collective-bargaining relationship
.... I]f the unit determination fails to relate to the factual situation with which the parties must
deal, efficient and stable collective bargaining is undermined rather than fostered."
124.

N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (emphasis supplied). The Board is not
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Board seeks to group employees united by a "community of interthe
tion 12
5
est."

Within a law firm there are three different types of employees that the Board
must consider in determining an appropriate bargaining unit: associate attorneys, paralegals, and administrative and support employees. Associate attorneys, as professional employees, may not be included in the unit by the Board
12 6
It is not clear whether
without the consent of a majority of attorneys.
12 7
and no Board or
paralegals are professional or nonprofessional employees,
court decisions have yet determined their status. Hence, paralegals may or
may not be included in a bargaining unit with the remaining administrative
and support employees of a firm.
The Regional Director of Region 2 has held that the administrative and
support personnel constitute a typical office clerical group for the purpose of
28
determination of an appropriate bargaining unit.' Applying the concept of a
required to choose the most appropriate unit, but may choose a unit within range of several
appropriate bargaining units in a particular situation. Wil-Kil Pest Control Co. v. NLRB, 440
F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1971). See also Wheeler-Van Label Co. v. NLRB, 408 F.2d 613 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 834 (1969); NLRB v. Davis Cafeteria, Inc., 396 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1968);
Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 36 (4th Cir. 1963). The NLRA, however, does not
provide the Board with explicit guidelines to make a determination. Section 9(b) merely states
that the determination assure the "employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this subchapter." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970). Beyond that general mandate, three
statutory limitations are provided. Section 9(b)(1) prohibits the inclusion of professional employees
in a unit with nonprofessional employees unless a majority of the professionals vote for inclusion.
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1). Section 9(b)(2) limits Board discretion with respect to craft units. 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b)(2). Section 9(b)(3) prohibits the inclusion of guards in a unit with other employees of that
employer. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3).
125. See NLRB v. Detective Intelligence Serv., Inc., 448 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir.
(1971) ('community of interest of employees is a significant doctrine when the Board is drawing an
appropriate unit'); Smith Steel Workers v. A.O. Smith Corp., 420 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1969)
("general community of interest of the employees carries substantial weight in defining the
appropriate unit'); Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966) ("touchstone of an
appropriate bargaining unit is the finding that all of its members have a common interest in the
terms and conditions of employment").
One commentator has noted that the board considers several factors in determining which of
the employees are united by a "community of interest," including: "(1) similarity In the scale and
manner of determining earnings; (2) similarity in employment benefits, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment; (3) similarity in the kind of work performed; (4) similarity In
the qualifications, skills and training of the employees; (5) frequency of contact or interchange
among employees; (6) geographic proximity; (7) continuity or integration of production processes;
(8) common supervision and determination of labor-relations policy; (9) relationship to the
administrative organization of the employer, (10) history of collective bargaining; (11) desires of the
affected employees; (12) extent of union organization." R. Gorman, supra note 31, at 69; see
Collins Radio Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 3 (1974); Colorado Nat'l Bank, 204 N.L.R.B. 243 (1973);
United States Steel Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 58 (1971); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 162 N.L.R.B.
387 (1966); Potter Aeronautical Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1965); Continental Baking Co., 99
N.L.R.B. 777 (1952).
126. See notes 135-37 infra and accompanying text.
127. See notes 143-48 infra and accompanying text.
128. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied,

1978]

UNIONIZING LAW FIRMS

1029

"community of interest," the Board has consistently held that fragmenting
office clerical groups results in inappropriate bargaining units. 29 For example, in National BroadcastingCompany, 130 the Board found that a bargaining
unit of messengers separate from other clerical employees was inappropriate
because of the high degree of job integration and the similarity of working
hours, conditions, and fringe benefits shared by messengers and all other
clerical employees.' 3 1 The messengers, the Board reasoned, did not perform
unique functions with characteristics "sufficient to set them apart in the face
of evidence as to the community of interest they share with other unrepresented employees.' 32 In an earlier case, in which the petitioning union sought
to represent a unit comprised solely of the employees of the accounting
department, the Board stated that "this department constitutes only a seg33
ment of the office force and may not therefore constitute a separate unit."'
Apparently, the Board will find that all administrative and support personnel
have a community of interest.
A.

Associate Attorneys

Although the NLRA is now considered to be applicable to lawyers as
employees, 134 lawyers must be treated according to a separate set of rules
established for professional employees.' 3 s Because professional employees
251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-I (Dec. 29, 1977). The administrative and support staff includes
the job classifications of: "library clerk, messenger, page, accounting clerk, receptionists, [xerographic copying machine] operator, telephone operator, managing attorney's clerk, file clerk,
secretary, pantry employee, mailroom employee, maintenance man and travel assistant." Brief
for Employer at 2, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725.
129. See National Broadcasting Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 155, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCU)
18,553 (Aug. 31, 1977); Bank of America, 174 N.L.RIB. 101 (1969); Royal Blue Print Co., 166
N.L.R.B. 205 (1967); Carling Brewing Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 347 (1960). See also General Elec.
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 811 (1964); Swift & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958).
130. 231 N.L.R.B. No. 155, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,553 (Aug. 31, 1977).
131. Id. at 30,845.
132. Id. (footnote omitted).
133. Carling Brewing Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 347, 348 (1960) (footnote omitted). The Board relied
on similarities of working terms and conditions, skills, education, and duties of the entire clerical
staff.
134. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 97 N.L.R.B. 929, 931 (1951); Lumbermen's Mut.
Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1134-39 (1948).
135. The Taft-Hartley Act amendments to the NLRA provided for a detailed definition of the
term "professional employee." Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136,
138-39, 143 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(12), i59(b)(1) (1970)). It provides: "The term
'professional employee' means-(a) any employee engaged in work (i)
predominantly intellectual
and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (i)
involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a
character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation
to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or
learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and
study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental,
manual, or physical processes; or (b)any employee, who (i) has completed . . . courses of
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"have a great community of interest in maintaining certain professional
standards," 136 the NLRA was amended in 1947 to provide that professional
employees be given the opportunity to vote as a separate subgroup on the
question of whether to be included in a unit that contained nonprofessional
employees. 137 The Board, then, may not decide to include associate attorneys
in a larger bargaining unit unless a majority of the attorneys have consented
to inclusion. Whether associates would want to be included is questionable, 138
but the Board has approved of bargaining units composed in part or wholly
of attorneys. 139 Furthermore, in a decision subsequent to Foley, Hoag &
specialized intellectual instruction and study . . . and (ii) is performing related work under the
supervision of a professional person . . . ." Id. In the House Conference Report, the Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare referred to the definition of professional employees and noted that
"[t]his definition in general covers such persons as legal, engineering, scientific and medical
personnel together with their junior professional assistants." H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1947).
136. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (19,47).
137. Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 20, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 (1947) (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970)). The inclusion of the two sections dealing with professionals was in
response to the finding by Congress that the Board was lumping professionals (including lawyers)
working for corporations into general units of production and maintenance or office and clerical
employees. See S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1947).
138. Spokespersons for the two unions most active in organizing law firm employees stated
that they had not been approached by any associates about organizing at their firms. Hochberger,
supra note 3, at 2, col. 4. See also Levin, supra note 3, at 4, col. 2. Associates may conclude that
the benefits of unionization might be outweighed by a danpening of their long-term pursuit of a
partnership in the firm. They may continue to believe that they have more to gain from
individual bargaining than from collective bargaining.
The prevalent antilabor view that unionism results in the elimination of individual merit
awards is indicated by the perception of professionals that the few who may desire unions are
"either mediocrities in need of such group support, or masochists." Labor Relations, supra note 1,
at 14. Nevertheless, increasing numbers of professional employees, including professional
athletes, nurses, and doctors, are finding the option of organization more attractive. Golodner,
Professionals Go Union, AFL-CIO American Federationist, Oct. 1973, at 8. Lawyers and
accountants in corporations are also opting for union representation as a means of improving
salaries, fringe benefits, and working conditions. Doctors, Nurses, Teachers-Why More Are
Joining Unions, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 10, 1975, at 61. See also Kassalow, supra note
2, at 51.
139. The Board's first case concerning unionization of attorneys was Lumbermen's Mut. Cas.
Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948). An unaffiliated labor organization sought to represent all the
investigators, adjusters, and attorneys employed in a branch office of the employer. Arguing that
attorneys are not employees within the meaning of the NLRA, the employer contended that
attorneys could not appropriately be included in any bargaining unit. The Board found that the
professional status of attorneys was not sufficient to deprive them of the benefits of the NLRA.
Citing the Senate and House Conference Reports, supra notes 135-36, the Board reasoned that
the addition of the definition of the term "professional employee" in § 2(2) of the NLRA and the
provision for a separate vote by such professional employees on the question of whether they
desire to be included in a unit containing nonprofessional employees manifested the intention of
Congress that attorneys be included in the definition of professional employees, and that
professional employees, as a class, should not be deprived of their right to be represented by a
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Eliot, the Board deemed appropriate a legal services bargaining unit that
included staff attorneys (excluding supervising attorneys), law school graduates who had not yet passed the bar, paralegals, secretaries, law students,
and investigators. 140 Thus, the Board appears to have clearly rejected any
general policy of excluding private law firm staff attorneys from bargaining
14
units.

1

B. Paralegals
It is more likely that organizational efforts will be directed at paralegals. 4 2
Whether or not paralegals employed by law firms will desire to unionize and,
labor organization. 75 N.L.R.B. at 1138. The Board decided, however, that attorneys should be
placed in a unit separate from other professional employees. See id. at 1139.
Attorneys, according to the Board, may only be excluded if they are found to be either
supervisory, management, or confidential employees. See id. at 1135. Since attorneys working for
an insurance company typically have "under" them only stenographers and clerks, and since they
have no authority to hire or fire, they were not deemed supervisors within the meaning of § 2(11)
of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). See id. at 1135-36. Moreover, because these attorneys
do not formulate or effectuate management policies and are not concerned with the employer's
labor relations policies, the Board found that they are not managerial or confidential employees.
See id. at 1136. See also Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 97 N.L.R.B. 929 (1951) (the Board found
that attorneys possessed the educational background requisite for professional status).
It must be noted, however, that the attorneys in Lumbermen's and Air Line Pilots had
exercised limited discretionary judgment. For example, the attorneys in Lumbermen's were not
permitted to make any settlements without the permission of their employer. 75 N.LR.B. at
1135. Typically, in a law firm major decisions are cleared by a partner before an associate can
act. As an associate rises through the ranks, however, he will take on greater responsibility and
be given greater discretion. Perhaps the Board may decide that associate attorneys, especially
senior associates, are closer to managerial employees than are attorneys employed directly by a
commercial enterprise, and may consequently deny them the protection of the NLRA. See Note,
Unionization of Attorneys, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 100, 106-08 (1971).
140. Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Servs., Inc., 229 N.L.R-B. No. 171, (1977-78] 5
Lab. L. Rep. (CCH) 18,229 at 30,262 (May 27, 1977) (The question of a separate unit for the
attorneys did not arise. Apparently, the labor organization involved was an in-house group
consisting of all of the employees.). The Board asserted that the position of the legal services
organization involved in this case was analogous to that of a private law firm. Id, The
Association of Legal Aid Attorneys is the recognized bargaining representative for the Legal Aid
Society and the Legal Services Staff Association represents attorneys and other employees of the
Community Action for Legal Services.
141. See notes 118-21 supra and accompanying text for types of confidentiality situations that
may dictate a broad decision to exclude certain attorneys from a bargaining unit.
142. The "increasingly prevailing term" "paralegal" will be employed throughout rather than
"legal assistant" or "legal paraprofessional." N. Shayne, The Paralegal Profession 2 (1977).
Although laymen have long been employed by lawyers for certain legal tasks, the emergence of
paralegals as a distinct type of employee is relatively new. The distinction between a legal
secretary and a paralegal is based on the expertise in legal concepts, procedures, and research that
a paralegal acquires as a result of a paralegal training program. Id. at 86, 157. Several
commentators have suggested that one way to improve the delivery of legal services is to expand
the use of paralegals within the legal profession. See generaly Brickman, Expansion of the
Lawyering Process Through a New Delivery System: The Emergence and State of Legal Para-
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if so, whether or not the Board will treat them as professionals are both open
questions. Because the concept of paralegal employees is relatively new, it is
difficult to generalize about the paralegals' position within the legal structure,
and specifically within a law firm. There is little doubt that paralegals desire
to be treated as professionals, 143 and at least one authority regards paralegals
as professionals. 44 However, the NLRB definition of the term professional
employee would seem to exclude these employees.1 4 S Paralegals are employed
to free the attorney from "tedious and routine" work that is probably not of
the "intellectual and varied character" contemplated by the NLRA. 46 In
addition, the feasibility of using paralegals at the present time is based on the
premise that legal problems can be broken down into small tasks that can
be
1 47
handled without "the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment."'
professionalism, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1153 (1971); see also ABA, Report to the House of Delegates of
the Special Committee on Legal Assistants (Feb. 1972); Hughes, Employment of Paralegalsinl
Trial Preparation, 11 Forum 1142, 1143 (1976).
In 1968, the ABA's House of Delegates adopted the Special Committee on the Availability of
Legal Services' Report, which recommended that many tasks now performed by lawyers could be
performed by trained paralegals and that the legal profession should encourage the training and
employment of such paralegals. Proceedings of the 1968 Annual Meeting of the House of
Delegates, 93 Ann. Rep. of the A.B.A. 344, 353 (1968). Their use would help insure that legal
services would be more available to the public since "freeing a lawyer from tedious and routine
detail" would conserve the lawyer's time and energy for "truly legal problems." Report of the
Special Committee on Availability of Legal Services, No. 3, 93 Ann. Rep. of the ABA 529 (1968).
143. In a recent survey conducted for the New York Law Journal, the authors reported that
52% of the respondents felt that they were treated as professionals all the time, 24% part of the
time, and 23% never. In spite of this, 87% stated that their work product was expected to be on a
professional level all of the time. Guinan & Ferguson, Paralegals Define Their Work, Skills,
Status in Profession, 177 N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
144. N. Shayne, The Paralegal Profession (1977). At the present time, there are several
approaches to training paralegals. See generally id. at 85. Certification of paralegals, establishing
high standards of proficiency and competence, could contribute to the professional status of
paralegals. In 1975 the Oregon State Bar Association first administered a certification examination for paralegals. To become certified, a paralegal must have completed 90 hours of credit
including 15 hours in 5 basic general areas relating to legal research and 45 in general college
courses. In addition, two years experience in a law office is required. Id. at 86-87.
145. See note 135 supra and accompanying text.
146. Id.
147. NLRA § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (1970); see Hughes, Employment of Paralegals in
Trial Preparation, 11 Forum 1142, 1142-43 (1976) (quoting ABA, Report to the House of
Delegates of the Special Committee on Legal Assistants (Feb. 1977)). Language used in a
somewhat analogous case is perhaps revealing on this question. In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
NLRB, 440 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971), the petitioning union sought to
include "Systems Analysts," a newly created job classification, in an existing bargaining unit
consisting of all office, clerical, and technical employees. The company maintained that the
analysts were professional employees who could not be placed in the unit without a special
election provided for by NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970). In finding that these
employees were not professional employees within the meaning of the NLRA, the court stated:
"[Alithough [they] do exercise some independence of judgment, their function is much narrower
than that of professional employees . . . and their range of discretion is not so broad . . . . The
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While paralegals may not meet NLRA standards for treatment as professionals, their desire to be treated as professionals is reflected in their desire to
be assigned more challenging and less routine work.148 The dissatisfaction of
paralegals with work assignments, coupled with the lack of adequate feedback within the law firm could serve as an impetus to organization. On the
other hand, the president of the New York City Paralegal Association has
stated that the effect of unionizing "would be to bring down in some way the
stature we would like to have. As professionals, unionizing would not be
appropriate. There's no point in antagonizing those we must work hand in
'149
glove with.
If paralegals do desire to organize and are not considered to be professionals, for the purpose of allowing them to exercise the professional employees' right to a separate vote, the Board may still find that paralegals do not
have a "community of interest" with the clerical workers and accord paralegals a separate bargaining unit.15 0
C. Administrative and Support Employees
The group of employees most susceptible to organization will be the
administrative and support personnel of medium and large firms with fifty or
more employees.151 In Hughes Hubbard & Reed, the Regional Director for
Analyst merely applies that process to particular assigned projects . . . his responsibilities are
much more clearly defined ... ." 440 F.2d at 9-10. It would seem that paralegals would fit this
description. In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Moore stated that in the future, this type of
job would require greater educational attainment and therefore such employees should not be
precluded from being treated as professionals. Id. at 13 (Moore, J., concurring). See also
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 163 N.L.R.B. 914, 916 (1967).
148. A large number of the paralegals surveyed felt that they received boring, repetitive, and
unchallenging assignments. See Guinan, supra note 143 at 4, col. 4.
149. Fitzhugh, supra note 13, at 3, col. 1. The organizer for District 65 also expressed
uncertainty as to whether paralegals would want to be included in a bargaining unit. Hochberger,
supra note 3 at 2, col. 4. It should be noted, however, that Local 6 of the International Federation
of Health Professionals is including paralegals in its petition. See 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1977, at
1, col. 5; 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 4.
150. Such a finding could be predicated on the usually greater educational levels of paralegals. See N. Shayne, The Paralegal Profession 85-86 (1977); Guinan & Ferguson, supra note 143,
at 4, col. 1.
151. See Levin, supra note 3, at 4, col. 3. Although office workers have been relatively
unreceptive to unionization, compared to blue-collar workers, several factors point to the
probability of increasing organization. Traditional barriers to unionization of office workers
include the fact that they have historically viewed themselves as superior to blue-collar workers
and thus considered that unionization would decrease their occupational status. See generally
Labor Relations, supra note 1, at 13; Kassalow, supra note 2, at 46. In addition, some
white-collar workers have readily identified with management because they perceive some
opportunity to advance into managerial ranks and are therefore more reluctant to support
unionization, which they perceive as a significant constraint on employer freedom of action.
Labor Relations, supra note 1, at 13-14; Kassalow, supra note 2, at 46. The above factors would
apply more to paralegals, see notes 142-48 supra and accompanying text, and to personal
secretaries employed by partners than to other clerical employees, who perform more standard-
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Region 2 has already ruled on the appropriateness of one clerical bargaining
unit.152 Hughes Hubbard & Reed was composed of about eighty attorneys
(thirty-one partners), fifteen paralegals, three accountants, and 150 administrative and support employees.15 3 The union I S 4 sought to represent the firm's
two xerographic copying machine operators, six pages, and nineteen messengers supervised directly by the office services manager.' ss The Regional
Director's review of the record revealed that the employees the union sought
to represent worked at a variety of tasks, performing duties in cooperation
with the other nonlegal employees. S 6 Although the firm's employees were
assigned to distinct job classifications for administrative purposes, the operation of the firm entailed a "continuous flow of work with substantial interdependency of functions" and similarity in duties. Is7 In addition, the adminisized and menial functions. As the gap between the income of blue-collar and white-collar workers
continues to widen, "appreciation of the fact that snobbishness neither purchases groceries nor
pays the rent" seems to account for the willingness of some white-collar employees, including
teachers, to consider organizing. Labor Relations, supra note 1, at 16. Perhaps more important,
the working conditions of these employees are changing in a direction that creates dissatisfaction.
"More and more white-collar workers are being routinized and bureaucratized. Office jobs in
instance after instance become less interesting in the wake of modernization. The white-collar
worker's relationship with his supervisor also becomes more remote; and, in most instances, he
has no individual contact with the public. Further, since such large numbers are employed, there
is a considerable blockage of upward mobility." Kassalow, supra note 2, at 47 (footnote omitted).
It is significant to note that since most office employees are women, women stand to gain the
most from the Foley decision. Traditionally, the large number of women in white-collar jobs has
proved to be an obstacle to unionism in offices. Kassalow, .upra note 2, at 46. Previously, most
women considered their employment to be short term and were therefore less likely to be
interested in unionizing as a long-term job safeguard. Id. However, female office workers have
begun to form groups to combat sex bias and petty chores. Lublin, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1. A
confederation of the various office worker groups representing women in banks, insurance
companies, law firms, publishing companies, brokerage houses, and universities may be the
"opening wedge in a drive to unionize secretaries and other clerical employees." Id. Women have
been increasingly aware of the need for collective bargaining to guarantee improved working
terms and conditions. Id. at 24, col. 4.
152. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977), review denied,
251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, 1977).
153. Id. at 3. Both parties agreed to the exclusion of the attorneys, paralegals, and
accountants. The remaining nonlegal employees were under the overall supervision of a director
of administration.
154. The union involved was Local 6, International Federation of Health Professionals.
155. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725, slip op. at 3 (Region 2 Sept. 30, 1977),
review denied, 251 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (Dec. 29, L977). The office services manager is
responsible for other nonlegal employees. This is significant since common supervision is one
criterion the Board uses in determining appropriate bargaining units. See note 125 supra and
accompanying text.
156. Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725, slip op. at 5.
157. Id. See also Brief for the Employer, at 16, Hughes Hubbard & Reed, No. 2-RC-17725.
A finding of substantial similarity and interchange in the job functions of the administrative and
support employees would be sufficient for the Board to find a unit which included only some of
the administrative and support employees to be inappropriate. See Potter Aeronautical Corp.,
155 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1965).
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trative and support personnel shared the same working hours, privileges,
conditions, and severance benefits. On the basis of these findings, the Regional Director concluded that all the firm's nonlegal employees constituted a
' 58
"typical office clerical unit which the Board constantly finds appropriate,"'
and that the petitioner had attempted to carve out a bargaining unit that was
neither all clerical workers nor even a separate departmental group.'9 Thus,
the Regional Director followed Board precedent against fragmenting
an office
60
clerical group and found petitioner's unit inappropriate.'
The Regional Director's ruling has been upheld by the Board, the obvious
implication being that a larger unit, containing all the law firm's clerical
employees, would be deemed appropriate.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Foley, the Board found that "law firms, as a class, do have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce"' 61 and asserted jurisdiction over them.
This decision means that employees of law firms are now entitled to organize,
bargain collectively, and strike under the protection of the NLRA and are
thus in a better position to gain greater concessions from the management of
law firms. To what extent employees will take advantage of this decision and
62
which employees will be most likely to do so have not yet been determined.'
It can be expected, however, that more employees will begin to organize and
that the greatest activity will be among the administrative and support
personnel, at least for the present time.
Another unclarified problem is the manner in which the Board will employ the confidential employee category to exclude either certain law firms as
a whole, or particular law firm employees from the bargaining unit. It does
appear, however, that firms engaged in little or no labor relations work will
not be treated differently from any other employer in this respect.' 63 In
addition, although the Board has upheld the Hughes Hubbard & Reed
decision, it is unclear whether the Board will continue to lump all administrative and support employees into one unit or will allow separate units for
158. No. 2-RC-17725, slip op. at S. See also General Elec. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 811 (1964);
Swift & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958).
159. No. 2-RC-17725, slip op. at 5.
160.

Id. at 6; see National Broadcasting Co., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 155, [1977-781 5 Lab. L.

Rep. (CCH) 18,553 (Aug. 31, 1977); Bank of America, 174 N.L.R.B. 101 (1969); Royal Blue
Print Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 205 (1967); Carling Brewing Co., 126 N.L.RtB. 347 (1960). See also
General Electric Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 811 (1964); Swift & Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1556 (1958). Local 6
appealed the decision. 178 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 10, 1977, at 1, col. 4. The Board dismissed the
appeal, however, stating that it raised no substantial issues. As suggested earlier, one factor that
might lead clerical employees to such union representation is the absence of personal contact
between white-collar clericals and management. In some law firms, however, legal secretaries
work in much closer contact with attorneys, and may have a consequently weaker desire to
unionize.
161. 229 N.L.R.B. No. 80, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep. (CC)
18,116, at 30,069.
162. See Fitzhugh, supra note 13, at 3, col. 1; Hochberger, supra note 3, at 1, col. 2 and at 2,
col. 3-4; Levin, supra note 3, at 4, cols. 2-4.
163. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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employees such as legal secretaries upon a showing of a lack of community of
interest. Another unclear point is the appropriate monetary standard the
Board will employ in deciding the law firms over which it will assert
jurisdiction. In Camden the Board set out a standard of $250,000 in gross
annual revenues. 164 However, the fact that the employer stipulated to a much
higher sum in Hughes Hubbard& Reed may be an indication that the Board
intends to increase the Camden figure. 165 One thing that is clear is that the
opportunity for those law firm employees who
Foley ruling has created a new 166
wish to organize into unions.
Georgene M. Vairo
164. Camden Regional Legal Servs., Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. No. 47, [1977-78] 5 Lab. L. Rep.
18,430 (Aug. 8, 1977).
(CCH)
165. See note 69 supra.
166. The success of the organizers will obviously depend on the actual conditions within any
given law firm. See Fitzhugh, supra note 13, at 1, col. 2-3.

